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Abstract 23 
Resilient infrastructure research has produced a myriad of conflicting definitions and analytic 24 
frameworks, highlighting the difficulty of creating a foundational theory that informs disciplines as 25 
diverse as business, engineering, ecology, and disaster risk reduction. Nevertheless, there is 26 
growing agreement that resilience is a desirable property for infrastructure systems – i.e., that 27 
more resilience is always better. Unfortunately, this view ignores that a single concept of resilience 28 
is insufficient to ensure effective performance under diverse stresses. Scholarship in resilience 29 
engineering has identified at least four irreducible resilience concepts, including: rebound, 30 
robustness, graceful extensibility, and sustained adaptability. In this paper, we clarify the meaning 31 
of the word resilience and its use, explain the advantages of the pluralistic approach to advancing 32 
resilience theory, and expound two of the four conceptual understandings: robustness and graceful 33 
extensibility. Furthermore, we draw upon examples in electric power, transportation, and water 34 
systems that illustrate positive and negative cases of resilience in infrastructure management and 35 
crisis response. The following conclusions result: 1) robustness and extensibility are different 36 
strategies for resilience that draw upon different system characteristics, 2) neither robustness nor 37 
extensibility can prevent all hazards, and 3) while systems can perform both strategies 38 
simultaneously, their drawbacks are different.  39 
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 50 
1. Introduction 51 
Prior to Holling's (1973) seminal publication, the word "resilience" was used in few scientific 52 
settings – notably, in materials science to describe elastic deformation under stress, and in 53 
psychiatry and psychology to describe the characteristics of individuals that allow them to recover 54 
from psychological trauma (Alexander 2013). These understandings of the word are analogous and 55 
consistent with the etymological roots of its original verb form, to resile, meaning “to return to a 56 
former position” (Alexander 2013), which is sometimes interpreted as "to bounce back" (e.g., 57 
Meerow, Newell, & Stults, 2016). Building upon Holling’s work, this understanding persists in the 58 
natural sciences through groups like the Resilience Alliance, which describes resilience as "the 59 
capacity of a social-ecological system to absorb or withstand perturbations and other stressors 60 
such that the system remains within the same regime, essentially maintaining its structure and 61 
functions" (C. S. Holling 1973; Holling and Gunderson 2002; Walker et al. 2004; Alliance 2017). 62 
More recently, usage of resilience has increased exponentially across various disciplines (Rose 63 
2017) with each new adoption resulting in efforts to redefine its meaning to fit the purposes of 64 
broad applications like business, sustainability, and disaster risk reduction (Hosseini, Barker, and 65 
Ramirez-Marquez 2016). For example, the United States National Academy of Sciences now defines 66 
disaster resilience as "the ability to plan and prepare for, absorb, recover from, and adapt to 67 
adverse events" (NAS 2012), where the United Nations defines disaster resilience as "the ability of a 68 
system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover 69 
from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation 70 
and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions," (UNISDR 2012). Both definitions 71 
draw upon the retrospective concept of returning to a former position through a process of 72 
recovery, but also include future and present temporal perspectives that seek to minimize 73 
hazardous outcomes in the first place. Holling's work expanded "resilience" from simple (material 74 
elasticity) and individual (psychology) applications to complex systems. Accommodating these new 75 
applications, understandings of the word resilience itself were made more complex. 76 
 77 
In ecology, resilience is a descriptive term that does not suggest one system state is better than any 78 
other. By contrast, in psychology, business, engineering, and other disciplines resilience is a 79 
normative term that largely suggests a preference for the status quo. The difference is most evident 80 
in contrasting the incorporation of recovery into the definitions of disaster resilience. To ecologists, 81 
recovery processes were dubbed “engineering resilience” (Gallopín 2006) to segregate them from 82 
socio-ecological perspectives, despite this misnomer ignoring technological systems in the 83 
Resilience Alliance's canonical definition. Still, the distinction is of critical importance as the 84 
dominant view in design disciplines such as engineering, architecture, and urban planning is that 85 
resilience is a good thing that successful systems do, need, or have when faced with adversity 86 
(Haimes 2009), suggesting more resilience is always better. This view is also evident in psychology, 87 
psychiatry, management, sustainability, and disaster risk reduction where resilience is the result of 88 
enacting positive coping capacities to better manage hazards and risks (Meerow, Newell, and Stults 89 
2016). However, the original verb resile is not meant to evoke success. Rather, it has pejorative 90 
connotations, as in reneging on a commitment or retreating from a prior position (Alexander 91 
2013). The positive perspectives of resilience which now dominate research overlook this 92 
pejorative definition and may limit theoretical progress by also overlooking possible ways systems 93 
cope with change.  94 
 95 
The idea that resilience might be both positive and negative is resurrected here to provide greater 96 
clarity and illustrative examples to two particular concepts of resilience important to infrastructure 97 
systems: robustness and extensibility. In particular, this paper describes how robustness and 98 
extensibility concepts guide different activities to maintain infrastructure services under stress 99 
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while simultaneously being the reason infrastructure services may be lost. To establish a 100 
foundational theory of resilience that is broadly generalizable, resilience research must realize the 101 
differences between concepts that only become clear when discussing both their desirable and 102 
undesirable qualities (Mochizuki et al. 2017). In our view, resilience research must shift from 103 
identifying which concept is superior to identifying use of both in practice and how to facilitate 104 
switching between them when needed. In this paper, we expound upon robustness and 105 
extensibility and draw upon examples in electric power, water management, and transportation 106 
systems to illustrate their positive and negative implications for infrastructure management and 107 
crisis response.  108 
 109 
1.1 Risk and Resilience in Infrastructure Systems  110 
Improving the resilience of infrastructure systems is meant to protect them from unforeseen and 111 
unknown threats, yet confusion remains over what resilient infrastructure is. “Resilience” entered 112 
the civil protection lexicon through materials science, medicine, psychology, social science, and 113 
ecology and has recently become a popular word describing the ability of infrastructure 114 
components and systems to handle adversity (Park et al. 2013; Eisenberg, Park, Bates, et al. 2014; 115 
Linkov et al. 2014). In the context of infrastructure, resilience is generally associated with the 116 
design of built systems and actions that ensure the provision of services like mobility, energy, and 117 
water when faced with threats (Francis and Bekera 2013; Bruneau et al. 2003). Even with broad 118 
consensus on the need to maintain the structure and function of built systems, literature reviews 119 
seeking to condense the growing number of research articles into specific definitions, metrics, 120 
methods, and applications continue to produce conflicting views. Resilience is often likened to 121 
divergent concepts like risk (Park et al. 2013; Park, Seager, and Rao 2011), reliability (Pettersen 122 
and Schulman 2015), sustainability (Seager 2008), adaptive capacity (Eisenberg, Park, Kim, et al. 123 
2014), and transformation (Amir and Kant 2017). Confusion is further amplified as numerous 124 
research articles and policy documents from influential organizations discuss infrastructure 125 
resilience (e.g., TRB 2011) or use resilience in their title (e.g., Wang et al. 2015) but fail to be 126 
informed by a mature theoretical understanding of resilience that can be broadly applied. 127 
 128 
Part of the reason that resilience is so difficult to apply in infrastructure systems is that the word 129 
itself occupies an awkward position in the English language. Although “resilience” is used as a noun, 130 
the most popular definitions describe it as a capacity to act – which makes resilience an action or 131 
property that systems perform, like a verb, rather than a property that a system has, like a noun. 132 
Table 1 compares different forms of the words “risk” and “resilience” to further illustrate this point. 133 
While both risk and resilience work well as abstract nouns, only risk works as a quantifiable noun. 134 
This may explain some of the difficulty that researchers have coming up with quantifiable, concrete 135 
measures of resilience for infrastructure. On the other hand, the action verb form of risk is a poor 136 
choice, whereas the word resile, although obscure, is nonetheless proper and useful. Risk works 137 
well as a linking or helping verb, but resile does not. The ways in which we can use these words in 138 
English creates constraints around the ways we think about them for infrastructure design and 139 
management. We can see that both risk and resilience can be used in noun and verb forms, but that 140 
risk works better as an objective, quantifiable noun and helping verb, whereas resilience works 141 
better as an action verb. We should think of infrastructure resilience not just in the capacity to act, 142 
but in the action itself. Consequentially, the tools and methods for measuring and addressing 143 
infrastructure risks are not appropriate for resilience, as these two related concepts are 144 
fundamentally different.  145 
 146 
 147 
 148 
 149 
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 150 
Table 1 | Comparison of the noun and verb forms of risk and resilience 151 
 152 
Note: Green and red colors emphasize grammatically correct and incorrect sentences, respectively. 153 
 154 
 155 
Infrastructure resilience as a verb endorses designing built systems with beneficial properties such 156 
as diversity (Ahern 2011) or efficiency (Fiksel 2003) to maintain service provision, as well as 157 
systems that have the capacity to switch between these properties. Major resilience research efforts 158 
across disciplines promote the need for an array of beneficial system properties that influence 159 
infrastructure failure response (see Kim et al., 2017 for a more comprehensive list of properties). 160 
However, designing built systems with beneficial qualities like efficient failure response systems is 161 
often in conflict with increasing the diversity of response options, as too many different 162 
technologies or decision-makers may inhibit timely crisis response (Roege et al. 2014). In contrast, 163 
efficient systems may fail in unknown and unforeseen situations that require a diversity of failure 164 
response options to maintain service provision (Fiksel 2003). Neither approach is perfect nor 165 
resilient. That is, resilience would neither be found in infrastructure systems that emphasize 166 
efficiency nor diversity, but rather in systems with a capacity to deploy efficiency in some scenarios 167 
and diversity in others. We refer to the act of designing infrastructure systems to have some 168 
combination of efficient, diverse, or otherwise beneficial properties as pursuing different resilience 169 
strategies. The shift from focusing on system properties to resilience strategies is important 170 
because any single strategy can help maintain a continuity of needs in the present, but if practiced 171 
forever may eventually fail. A theory of resilience therefore cannot promise complete protection of 172 
built systems and services against all adverse events, but it could reveal the benefits and limitations 173 
of different adaptive strategies in practice. The verb resile in this context refers to need to switch 174 
between strategies when current practices are found to be impractical or dangerous, e.g., when 175 
efficiency trumps diversity, or vice versa. 176 
 177 
1.2 Concepts of Resilience for Infrastructure Systems 178 
We build upon work in the subdiscipline of “resilience engineering” to realize how different 179 
resilience strategies may be implemented in infrastructure systems. Resilience engineering has a 180 
large and growing body of literature with roots in system safety and organizational theory relevant 181 
to the design and management of infrastructure (Jackson and Ferris 2012; Seager et al. 2017). In 182 
general, authors within the subdiscipline share consistent views of resilience as an action systems 183 
do, rather than a property they have (e.g., Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2007; 184 
Madni & Jackson, 2009). Still, the subdiscipline has more than three decades of development and 185 
debate that contrast different strategies to engineer systems to handle unknown and unforeseen 186 
events (Righi, Saurin, and Wachs 2015; Le Coze 2015; Haavik et al. 2016). Recently, four concepts of 187 
resilience extant in the literature were distinguished that can form the basis for resilience strategies 188 
in infrastructure systems (Woods 2015; Seager et al. 2017): 189 
Part of Speech Risk Resilience 
Abstract Noun What is risk? What is resilience? 
Concrete / 
Quantifiable Noun 
What is a risk? What is a resilience? 
Action Verb I risked. I resiled. 
Linking Verb I risk floods. I resile floods. 
Helping Verb I risk flooding. I resile flooding. 
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 Resilience as rebound – to return to normal activities after traumatic events. 190 
 Resilience as robustness – to manage increasing stressors, complexity, and challenges with 191 
limited to no impact on normal activities. 192 
 Resilience as graceful extensibility – to extend existing system performance when surprise 193 
events challenge current capabilities. 194 
 Resilience as sustained adaptability – to manage trade-offs and build adaptive capacity to 195 
continuously evolving contexts. 196 
Given this pluralistic view, each concept reflects a distinct strategy to maintain the structure and 197 
function of built systems tailored to a specific stress context. That is, no single concept is 198 
appropriate for all stress conditions, and each concept may be more or less desirable when applied 199 
in practice. Still, previous work only delineates theoretical differences between concepts rather 200 
than discussing which stress contexts they manage or how to implement them in infrastructure. 201 
Here, we demarcate the stress contexts that robustness and extensibility manage and identify the 202 
ways to implement each strategy in electric power, transportation, and water management 203 
systems. We focus on robustness and extensibility because both concepts emphasize adaptive 204 
actions to maintain service provision, rather than return systems to a previous state or evolve to 205 
changing contexts. Thus, both are comparable in practice, and their clarification can inform broad 206 
understandings of infrastructure resilience. 207 
 208 
2. Robustness as a Resilience Strategy 209 
Robustness as a resilience strategy emphasizes active buffering and dynamic reallocation of 210 
resources in response to known hazards and in accordance with explicit protocols, policies, or 211 
procedures, while accepting the inevitability that surprises may lead to catastrophic losses. For 212 
example, highway rules sometimes allow travel in shoulder lanes during periods of peak travel or 213 
inclement weather, called “hard shoulder running” (Buckeye 2012; Chun and Fontaine 2016). 214 
Under ordinary conditions travel in the roadway shoulder would be prohibited, with the space at 215 
the side of the road reserved for emergency and broken-down vehicles. However, during times 216 
expected to be peak travel periods, some rules designate the shoulders for travel, increasing the 217 
capacity of the roadway and mitigating the likelihood of traffic jams. While this policy is adaptive in 218 
the sense that it deploys the capacity of the roadway shoulder only when the normal travel lanes 219 
would be overwhelmed, this dynamic reallocation of resources also leaves the highway system 220 
vulnerable to massive congestion. Without a shoulder, crashes or breakdowns will cause even 221 
greater impacts to traffic given that response vehicles (e.g., police, tow trucks) will be delayed 222 
without a clear path by which to reach the site of the emergency. 223 
 224 
Robustness is often the adaptive strategy employed when infrastructure designers and managers 225 
are able to correctly forecast known adverse events and establish automatic sensory and control 226 
systems to dynamically reallocate resources. The need for a continuity of services in infrastructure 227 
systems suggests that any loss of structure or function must be avoided. Robustness epitomizes 228 
fault or disruption prevention by designing well-controlled systems which avert known dangers via 229 
calculated precision, accuracy, and repeatability. We delineate robust systems from others as those 230 
that avert known “faults” or “disruptions”. Robustness requires that threats must be recognized and 231 
designed for prior to their onset to ensure infrastructure services remain available. In other words, 232 
robust systems only prevent perturbations that are known a priori, and avert losses to these 233 
anticipated stressors by established IF...THEN contingencies in such a way that service users never 234 
experience a change in quality or access.  235 
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Still, pursuing robustness exclusively for infrastructure protection will never ensure a continuity of 236 
services to all hazards. It emphasizes threat identification as the first and foremost step prior to any 237 
design actions.  Nonetheless, any attempt to prevent one type of failure may increase the likelihood 238 
and damages experienced from others (Alderson and Doyle 2010). When robustness fails, it 239 
typically is because reallocation of resources results in sudden and catastrophic collapse when 240 
system loads become overwhelming, or the system encounters unexpected stressors for which no 241 
contingency exists.  242 
Recent controversies involving United Airlines treatment of passengers exemplified a robustness 243 
failure. In one instance, United was criticized for refusing to board passengers that were, in the 244 
opinion of the gate agents, improperly dressed to fly on complementary tickets reserved for 245 
company friends and family. Airline officials defended the decision of the gate agents by saying they 246 
were acting in accordance with United policies that require friends and family be held to higher 247 
dress code standards than paid passengers. However, just a few weeks later the airline found itself 248 
the target of public outcry for forcibly dragging a paid passenger from an overbooked plane (Pizam 249 
2017). Again, officials defended the actions of the flight and ground crews as consistent with airline 250 
policies and protocols. Only later did the CEO admit that the company failed to communicate to 251 
front line employees that they could exercise discretion in the enforcement of those policies, rather 252 
than resort to excessive force. These examples demonstrate that customer service policies work 253 
well for known situations, yet these same policies may exacerbate situations for which they were 254 
not developed. 255 
  256 
2.1 Designing Robust Infrastructure Systems 257 
One of the advantages of robustness strategies is that they lend themselves to automatic control 258 
systems. Thus, robustness might be best achieved by technologies in isolation, rather than humans 259 
in isolation. For example, at complex roadway intersections, it is becoming more common to deploy 260 
cameras and other traffic sensors that feed information to automated control algorithms and adjust 261 
signal timings to reallocate green lights to the lanes or turns that are in greatest demand. Because 262 
the stressors and remedies are pre-programmed, they can be implemented immediately without 263 
the additional cost of human intervention. However, under unusual traffic conditions such as a 264 
crash site, a temporary closure for a special event, or a special procession, it is still common to 265 
employ human police to override automated control systems.  266 
Even when using linear models and simple equations, calculating the flow of resources like 267 
electricity, water, data, and traffic is a demanding task. The most effective robust designs consider 268 
all aspects of future hazards and system dynamics, including how system losses propagate in many 269 
different operational scenarios. Computers can complete these tasks flawlessly in fractions of time. 270 
This characteristic difference in precision and throughput between technology and people can be 271 
further expanded to suggest that technology will outperform people when completing any complex 272 
task with explicit rules such as driving (Fagnant and Kockelman 2015) and games like Go (Lee et al. 273 
2016). Each of these systems epitomizes robustness by averting anticipated hazards through well-274 
defined tasks and by experiencing difficulty when managing situations with ill-defined rules. 275 
Because technologies have the throughput and precision to ensure robustness and lack the 276 
fallibility of humans in well-defined scenarios, robustness is largely a technological hazard 277 
prevention strategy,  278 
Although computerized systems epitomize robust operations, robust approaches to resilience can 279 
also be carried out by people when conforming to prescribed responses to known threats. For 280 
example, generation-load dispatch in power grids can be optimized to reduce the probability of 281 
losses to unusual weather, rare and novel threats like geomagnetic disturbances (Lu et al. 2017), 282 
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and hurricanes (Pasqualini 2017). To realize these adaptive actions, sensor information is used to 283 
update operational protocols and reliable human responses. Robustness enhancing policies include 284 
N-k reliability standards that require operations of N interconnected infrastructures to survive k 285 
failures without reduction in service constraints. The standard for electric power grids is N-1 286 
reliability (Corporation 2014), where systems are designed to continue functioning after the loss of 287 
any single infrastructure, but is not necessarily guaranteed for a larger number of failures. Similar 288 
thresholds exist in infrastructure operations, including limits on the number of system errors 289 
allowed to occur and their impact on customer access to services (Roe and Schulman 2012). Thus, 290 
robustness requires explicit contingency policies that demand reliable human actions.  291 
2.2 Tradeoffs of Pursuing Robustness in Infrastructure Systems 292 
Robustness has limitations for managing inconceivable threats that may prove disastrous. 293 
Improving a system to handle a known threat can increase the likelihood that other threats will 294 
cause greater damages, as has been demonstrated in control theory (Alderson and Doyle 2010). 295 
This tradeoff exists when implementing any of the adaptive robustness strategies described above 296 
in infrastructure systems – redesigning the interactions among built components, changing 297 
operational methods, and developing regulatory thresholds for ordinary operations – where 298 
tradeoffs exist even among robustness strategies themselves. In complex systems, this is referred to 299 
as the conservation of fragility (Doyle et al. 2005; Alderson and Doyle 2010) and is most 300 
pronounced in systems highly optimized to few, specific threats. The more robustness is pursued to 301 
increase the resilience of infrastructure, the greater the risk that catastrophic failures can occur 302 
from unforeseen events.  303 
In some cases, robust contingency plans remain underdeveloped because rare events are 304 
misunderstood as inconceivable – even when they are well within the imagination of infrastructure 305 
operators and managers. The near-breaching of the Oroville Dam in California serves an important 306 
case of imagined catastrophes being realized. In 2005, several environmental groups expressed 307 
concern that allowing high water levels to overtop a secondary (i.e., emergency) spillway may cause 308 
significant damage to the dam, surrounding power plants, fisheries, communities, and waterways 309 
(Sierra Club, 2005). Although infrastructure managers refuted this vision by claiming the safety of 310 
the dam and reservoir control would not be compromised in the event of an emergency spillway 311 
discharge (FERC, 2006), a surge of rain and melting snow pack in February 2017 combined with a 312 
structural failure of the main spillway overwhelmed the capacity of existing operating procedures 313 
to ensure the safety of downstream communities. The realization of events outside operational 314 
routine and thresholds demonstrate the potential drawbacks of robust infrastructure management 315 
(FERC, 2006).  316 
 317 
3. Extensibility as a Resilience Strategy 318 
An extensible infrastructure system seeks the same outcome as a robust system, which is to prevent 319 
loss of services by protecting the system against hazards. However, extensible infrastructure 320 
systems achieve protection in a contradictory way to robustness – by defying rules and protocols 321 
rather than shoring them up. Events like Deepwater Horizon and the Fukushima Daiichi Meltdown 322 
were exacerbated into disasters by built systems working (and failing) in known ways and people 323 
following the rules to manage them (Park et al., 2011). Seminal works by Perrow (1984) and 324 
Hollnagel et al. (2014) argue that these events are caused by characteristically different stressors 325 
from faults or disruptions, called surprises, that cannot be anticipated a priori. However, even where 326 
hazards are pre-conceived, contingencies plans will fail in the face of complexity, as a sufficient 327 
number of simultaneous disruptions, feedback loops, or maladaptive responses can result in  328 
“normal accidents” (Perrow 1984) that amplify consequences beyond any previous expectations. 329 
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Following the rules and norms established for the operation and management of these cascading, 330 
unforeseen scenarios may only exacerbate damages (Hollnagel and Goteman 2004). In these cases, 331 
extensibility is needed to break established systems, norms, rules, or expectations to arrest failures. 332 
Thus, we define extensibility in infrastructure systems as the adaptive modification of existing 333 
system structures and functions to prevent losses resulting from surprise. 334 
In contrast to the United Airlines example of robustness failure, the actions of Captain Sullivan in 335 
the case of US Airways 1549 after dual engine failure exemplify abandoning robustness in favor of 336 
extensibility. According to Capt. Sullivan’s testimony and after action findings, it was only by 337 
departing from established procedures that the pilots were able to land the plane in the Hudson 338 
river without a single loss of life (NTSB, 2010). While the crew was trained in emergency 339 
procedures for engine failure, these procedures assumed cruising altitude and never anticipated 340 
total loss of engine thrust at a low altitude so soon after takeoff. The resulting checklists for dual 341 
engine failure included many more checks than the pilots had time to complete prior to emergency 342 
landing (NTSB, 2010). In this event, following the explicit rules prior to ditching may have led to 343 
catastrophe by slowing decision-making processes. Instead, the pilots extended response protocols 344 
by skipping several recommended tasks and improvising a safe response.  345 
3.1 Designing Extensible Infrastructure Systems 346 
Extensibility requires that infrastructure systems have controls that can be turned on, shut down, 347 
modified, or moved to arrest surprising threats. These controls allow human discretion. For 348 
example, modern office buildings increasingly use motion detectors to control lights and faucets, 349 
thereby avoiding the waste associated with lighting unoccupied rooms or running water into empty 350 
sinks. However, almost all modern office occupants have experienced the frustration of having the 351 
automatic light switches turn off accidentally, or the frustration of waving their hands in front of an 352 
automatic faucet in an attempt to get running water. Manual light switches and faucets are the 353 
consumer analog of circuit breakers in power systems (Chen, Wang, and ton 2017), activated 354 
floodways in streamflow management systems (Park et al. 2013), and ad hoc communication 355 
networking devices (Loo, Mauri, and Ortiz 2012). Although these systems are sometimes used for 356 
normal infrastructure operations--e.g., in power distribution systems and roadway management-- 357 
they enable humans to respond to surprises by opening and closing paths for service flow, allowing 358 
infrastructure to function beyond designed thresholds, and switching on and off backup resources.  359 
Extensibility is engineered into various infrastructure systems through the use of human-in-the-360 
loop systems that enable people to rearrange physical dependencies, system operation, and 361 
management processes. These systems are evident in control rooms where operators manipulate 362 
the structure and function of built systems. For example, all major factories and plants use 363 
supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) to collect and display real-time data on 364 
the function of working infrastructure (e.g., a turbine) and enable operators to modify 365 
infrastructure working conditions (e.g., is the turbine on or off). A common operator practice is to 366 
disregard information these systems display as SCADA systems are notorious for calculating and 367 
displaying unrealistic system errors (Schulman et al. 2004), many of which are either benign, or if 368 
acted upon, would increase the possibility of a disruption to critical services . In response, 369 
operators must identify and ignore these errors, or in certain cases, actively generate them (Roe 370 
and Schulman 2012) to maintain continuous service provision. Assuming that there is no 371 
prescribed way in which SCADA errors are ignored or initiated, control room operators are 372 
practicing infrastructure extensibility by applying their own expert heuristics to unpredictable 373 
circumstances. 374 
Infrastructure policies that promote extensibility use imprecise language in support of context-375 
specific implementation. Designing extensible infrastructure systems requires that people 376 
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associated with infrastructure operations and management have the ability to influence and 377 
redirect service provision. While policies for robust solutions assign explicit thresholds and roles 378 
for infrastructure providers, extensible policies have “strategic ambiguity” (Davenport and Leitch 379 
2005) to empower people to act on their own volition. For example, military doctrine has now 380 
adopted the principal of “commander’s intent” that allow for ingenuity and adaptation in the field 381 
(Shattuck and Woods 2000). The commander’s intent gives high level, strategic direction, but 382 
remains ambiguous in the specific tactics or pathways that may be used to achieve the intent. 383 
Similarly, standards for developing and maintaining manufacturing robots utilize ambiguous 384 
language, using the term “justifiable trust” for the necessary amount of trust the technological 385 
system is meant to display to the human operators that work with them (Eder, Harper, and 386 
Leonards 2014). The ambiguous nature of this term is purposeful to force a broad interpretation of 387 
trust across many manufacturing industries and foster systems with flexible approaches to 388 
sociotechnical safety. This ambiguity supports extensibility by requiring infrastructure providers to 389 
continuously manage shifting interpretations of trust across their respective industries similar to 390 
shifting international politics surrounding nuclear and cyber warfare (Libicki 2011).  391 
3.2 Tradeoffs of Pursuing Extensibility in Infrastructure Systems  392 
Extending current infrastructure systems to handle surprises may also increase the risk that known 393 
disruptions become unmanageable through inefficient and distributed decision-making practices. 394 
Embedding people in infrastructure and creating human-in-the-loop, activated, and strategically 395 
ambiguous systems supports surprising responses to surprising events by not setting explicit rules. 396 
The greater the extensibility of an infrastructure system, the greater the risk that systems 397 
experience a brittle failure (i.e., sudden and cascading) because adaptive actions exhaust routine 398 
resources. When a system draws upon shared resources to practice extensibility, communication 399 
breakdowns can result in lack of coordination, working at cross-purposes, and loss of productivity 400 
such that existing resources are insufficient to keep pace with increasing demands.  401 
We refer to these processes collectively as “decompensation”: when a sociotechnical system 402 
exhausts its extensibility in a way that jeopardizes other hazard prevention activities (Woods and 403 
Branlat 2011). An example of decompensation in infrastructure systems comes from roadway 404 
management. Deployable traffic control equipment can be used to create a detour around accidents 405 
for the safety of local drivers. While this detour exists, the use of equipment may increase the risk of 406 
a major traffic jam as other accidents and crisis situations cannot be detoured because traffic 407 
control equipment is already committed. In this example, the road system may experience a brittle 408 
failure (sudden, large traffic jam) as the routine activity (detour) is unavailable when extensible 409 
resources (traffic control equipment) are committed to other activities (working at cross purposes). 410 
Not all extensibility is “graceful”. Where decompensation results in a degradation of performance, a 411 
system may be extended in ways that management may fail to recognize – even in the face of 412 
overwhelming evidence. For example, evidence of decompensation can be found in “near misses” 413 
(Woods 2006), when catastrophic failure was narrowly avoided through some human ingenuity 414 
and adaptation. However, people may misinterpret the lesson from the near miss as evidence that 415 
they are more robust than they really are, rather than interpreting the near miss as evidence of 416 
decompensation. The ongoing water quality crisis in Flint, Michigan emphasizes the danger of 417 
overlooking near misses. In 2014, the decision for the City of Flint to change water sources from 418 
Detroit to the Flint River extended distribution systems to convey water with historically worse 419 
water quality (Masten, Davies, and McElmurry 2016). Subsequent discovery of pathogens and 420 
corrosive chemicals in city water led to a series of boil water warnings and attempts by local 421 
residents to switch water sources again, this time away from the Flint River (Zahran, McElmurry, 422 
and Sadler 2017). Attempts to change water sources were rebuked by government officials 423 
believing corrective actions taken by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality to treat 424 
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Flint River water were effective (Pulido 2016). This failure to recognize decompensation 425 
exacerbated the initial extensibility of built systems to use a new water source and human actions 426 
to continually correct mounting issues. Eventually, the failure to act upon early issues regarding E 427 
coli and corrosion exposed residents to water with Legionnaires disease (Masten, Davies, and 428 
McElmurry 2016) and an unsafe concentration of lead (Zahran, McElmurry, and Sadler 2017).  429 
Decompensation is only possible when systems have extensibility. As humans are best at 430 
recognizing surprises and breaking the rules, the act of extending system capabilities is shaped by 431 
the same fallibility that makes people worse than computers at robustness. The example of control 432 
room operators ignoring SCADA errors emphasizes that “graceful” extensibility requires human 433 
agency and ingenuity during times of system stress to defy norms, procedures, and faults. As the 434 
operators form heuristics for managing SCADA errors, the system that was previously extensible 435 
can become decompensated to follow specific protocols. Keeping human-in-the-loop operation 436 
‘graceful’ requires learned heuristics to ensure operators retain the capacity to recognize and 437 
respond to surprises, even though these heuristics may be fallible. Preconditioned systems and 438 
optimization protocols do not allow for grace. Even the most sophisticated technological and 439 
artificial intelligence systems require explicit rules for making decisions that the algorithms 440 
themselves do not change.   441 
 442 
4. Comparison of Robustness and Graceful Extensibility for Infrastructure Systems 443 
We compare robustness and graceful extensibility as distinct concepts based on at least three 444 
criteria for infrastructure systems: threat perception, failure response, and implementation 445 
strategies. Pursuing robustness requires threat identification as a first step, and is most appropriate 446 
for managing frequent threats with which operators have prior experience or historical data. By 447 
contrast, graceful extensibility requires the treatment of threats as surprises and is more 448 
appropriate for unprecedented events. The strategies themselves become less and less useful when 449 
misapplied, such that robust systems fail under surprise and extensibility fails under 450 
decompensation. Although both strategies are pursued in distinct ways, by emphasizing different 451 
approaches to future threats, they may complement each other in practice.  452 
Robust strategies defer decision-making to pre-determined contingency plans and protocols with 453 
strict rules for decision-making, information sharing, and action. Failure to have, know, and follow 454 
known protocols will quickly lead to loss of services. In contrast, extensible systems are successful 455 
in unconstrained, imagined situations that require improvisation to try new ideas. Risk of system 456 
failure increases as decompensation limits response options and available extensibility is wasted, 457 
unbeknownst to infrastructure providers. As systems become decompensated, people are forced to 458 
extend systems without regard to how improvised activities further decompensate them. 459 
Decompensation can overwhelm extensible systems, just surprises may overwhelm robust systems. 460 
Some infrastructure designs already embrace the capacity to be robust and extensible, such as 461 
switching between manual and autopilot systems in commercial planes during flight. Autopilot is a 462 
robust solution to safe flight, making it unable to handle surprising threats. Humans can overtake 463 
automated systems at any given time, increasing the extensibility of current systems. This is 464 
standard in situations where constant training is needed or surprises are common, such as take-off 465 
and landing. Still, the moments in which the aircraft is controlled entirely by the pilot are 466 
susceptible to decompensation. 467 
Robustness and extensibility in infrastructure systems require distinct implementation strategies. 468 
Summarized in Tables 2 and 3 is a non-exhaustive list of ways in which both strategies can be 469 
implemented in infrastructure systems with specific examples for electric power, transportation, 470 
and water systems. This list is based upon well-known approaches used by infrastructure 471 
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designers, operators, and managers to maintain the structure and function of built systems and 472 
provides a new organization of these strategies based on robustness and extensibility. Rows within 473 
the tables compare robustness and extensibility strategies across different infrastructure systems. 474 
For example, manual switchgear in power systems offers equivalent control over power flow as 475 
deployable traffic equipment in roadways and activated floodways in flood control systems (Table 476 
3). Cells across Tables 2 and 3 offer comparison between robustness and extensibility strategies in 477 
practice. For example, using automated flow regulating devices is a robustness strategy to flood 478 
management that is built directly into the water infrastructure system (Table 2). Likewise, 479 
activated floodways that must be opened or destroyed to control floodwaters could be extensible 480 
infrastructures built into the system wherever operating rules require expert judgment for their 481 
actuation. Both flood control infrastructures provide the same services, but in characteristically 482 
different ways.  483 
Across all three infrastructure systems common methods for automating systems exist, including 484 
computer controlled services to protect infrastructure and users like self-islanding microgrids and 485 
self-driving cars. Robust human responses are supported by strict operations and maintenance 486 
expectations like vegetation management and material specifications. Moreover, policies and 487 
standards support robustness by further defining normal operations through strict reliability 488 
criteria and regulatory requirements. 489 
Graceful extensibility can also be designed into the technological and human systems that make up 490 
infrastructure, yet appear as different kinds of human-in-the-loop design through activated systems 491 
and strategically ambiguous policies. Common activated infrastructures include circuit breakers 492 
and floodways and deployable technologies like power conditioning batteries, bridge retrofits, 493 
floodwalls, and sandbags. Assuming sensor networks and infrastructures are feeding human 494 
decisions rather than automated systems, the move to smart grid, transportation, and water 495 
infrastructure may be increasing the capacity of people to take improvisational actions and make 496 
graceful decisions. Finally, strategically ambiguous operational protocols and policies support 497 
heuristic response by giving autonomy to infrastructure providers. Some reliability indices used 498 
across infrastructure systems like SAIDI enable this form of autonomy among power providers. 499 
Similar autonomy is gained in US transportation systems through different enforcement policies 500 
across city and state lines for equivalent laws (e.g., speed limits and ticketing expectations).  501 
None of the strategies in Table 2 for designing robust built systems, operational protocols, and/or 502 
policies preclude those in Table 3 for gracefully extensible systems. In other words, infrastructure 503 
systems can and are designed to have a redundancy of options that support both robust and 504 
extensible hazard prevention strategies. One example would be an activated infrastructure that has 505 
both automatic systems to prevent known failures and human activated systems to enable 506 
extensibility such as some microgrids in power systems that have automatic and on-site control 507 
systems. However, few infrastructure components or systems are designed for this form of 508 
optionality, making it difficult to fund redundancy among strategies. In current infrastructure 509 
operations and management environments with limited time and money, infrastructure providers 510 
will be faced with choosing to employ one strategy or the other.  511 
 512 
 513 
 514 
 515 
 516 
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Table 2 | Robust infrastructure implementation strategies 517 
Implementation and Design Electric Power1 Transportation2 Water3 
Built System Automating  Automatic circuit 
reconfiguration 
 Self-islanding 
microgrids 
 Intelligent 
transportation 
systems 
 Automated 
signaling 
systems 
 Self-driving 
cars 
 Flow regulating 
devices 
 Remote water 
quality monitoring 
system 
Infrastructure 
Operations 
Explicit 
Protocols 
 Operator training 
to follow strict 
protocols 
 Vegetation 
management 
 Managed lanes 
 Infrastructure 
materials 
specifications 
 Maintenance 
and 
development 
policies 
 
 Dam discharge and 
flood warning 
protocols 
 Inspection, 
maintenance, and 
enforcement 
programs to ensure 
continued function 
of dams and levees 
 Emergency water 
supply plans (e.g.,  
for health care 
facilities) 
Policies and 
Standards 
Operational 
Thresholds 
 N-1 reliability 
criteria 
 Minimum 
generation reserve 
margins 
 Frequency and 
stability limits 
 
 Return period 
for 
infrastructure 
design 
 Insurance and 
tax limitations 
 
 Hydrographs for 
design storms 
 Floodplain 
management 
ordinance (e.g., 
elevation 
certificates, flood 
insurance) 
 Fire flow rules for 
water distribution 
systems 
Note: sources for table contents – 1(NAS 2017),  2(Markolf et al. 2017; Meyer and Weigel 2011; Meyer et al. 518 
2011; TRB 2011), and 3(FEMA 2013; Balcazar 2012; Le Dinh et al. 2007; Dawson et al. 2011; Park et al. 2013). 519 
 520 
 521 
 522 
 523 
 524 
 525 
 526 
 527 
 528 
 529 
 530 
 531 
 532 
 533 
 534 
 535 
 536 
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Table 3 | Extensible infrastructure implementation strategies 537 
Implementation and Design Electric Power1 Transportation2 Water3 
Built System Activated 
Infrastructure 
 Manual switchgear 
and circuit breakers 
 Utility scale 
batteries for power 
conditioning 
 Modular 
construction 
techniques 
 Deployable 
retrofits 
 Deployable 
traffic 
management 
infrastructures 
 Activated floodways 
 Detention/retention 
basin parks 
 Dam spillways 
 Water shut-
off/isolation valves in 
distribution systems 
 Connecting 
alternative water 
source to the building 
plumbing 
 
 Human-in-
the-Loop 
Design 
 Demand response 
 Household 
distributed energy 
resources (solar 
panels and wind 
turbines) 
 Non-automated 
microgrids (on-site 
management) 
 Human 
drivers, pilots, 
and captains of 
vehicles 
 Roundabouts 
 Clearing garbage or 
sediment build-up in 
stormwater drains 
 Self-assessment 
guide for drinking 
water 
 Arranging with 
another public water 
supply to obtain 
potable water (e.g., 
water delivery 
trucks) 
Infrastructure 
Operations 
Strategic 
Ambiguity 
 Operator training 
without explicit 
protocols and 
expectations 
 Intersections and 
lanes managed 
by traffic officers  
 
 Implementing 
damage reduction 
measures for existing 
buildings such as 
acquisition, 
relocation, 
retrofitting, and 
maintenance of 
drainage ways and 
retention basins  
 Human-in-
the-Loop 
Design 
 Smart grid systems 
and software for 
situational 
awareness 
 
 Smart traffic 
sensors and 
SCADA systems 
 Real-time traffic 
and route 
management 
 
Policies and 
Standards 
Strategic 
Ambiguity 
 System interruption 
and availability 
indices without 
explicit thresholds 
(e.g., SAIDI) 
 Enforcement of 
speed limits and 
traffic laws 
 
 Low Impact 
Development 
practices 
Note: sources for table contents – 1(NAS 2017), 2(Fawcett et al. 2015; ITS International 2017; SMART 538 
Motorway Tunnel 2017; Markolf et al. 2017), and 3(Park et al. 2013; Ahern 2011; Dawson et al. 2011; Le Dinh 539 
et al. 2007; Balcazar 2012; FEMA 2013) 540 
 541 
 542 
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5. Conclusion 543 
For robustness and extensibility to be different resilience concepts, there must exist different 544 
characteristic stress contexts that impact infrastructure services. We categorize these based on the 545 
stressors each resilience concept handles best – robustness prevents losses to known disruptions 546 
and faults, where graceful extensibility prevents losses to surprises.  Many of the differences 547 
between resilience strategies in practice come from the initial conceptualization of system 548 
stressors, and infrastructure solutions tend to follow choice of stress context. A focus on calculated, 549 
detailed faults and disruptions emphasizes automated, robust solutions. In contrast, a focus on 550 
complex, systemic interactions that generate surprising responses will emphasize extensible 551 
solutions to embed decision-makers and ways to rearrange systems on the fly. 552 
Following that multiple stress contexts exist, there is a need for both robust and extensible systems 553 
to manage the stressors that threaten infrastructure systems. Neither pre-defined rules nor 554 
ambiguous policies manage all stress contexts, and a blend of both approaches will be necessary to 555 
protect infrastructure systems. Pursuing resilience as a verb in infrastructure systems cannot 556 
endorse automated nor human controlled systems alone, but suggests that strategies that bridge 557 
them may handle a large number of stress contexts. Consequently, where a single concept of 558 
resilience dominates governance of infrastructure systems, more of that single concept may have 559 
counterproductive effects.  Based on this work, resilient strategies must be shared between the 560 
robustness provided primarily by technologies and the extensibility provided primarily by human 561 
expert ingenuity. 562 
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